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EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh* and James R. McClelland**
RELEVANCY

Admissibility-Risk of Improper Use inJury and Non-Jury Trials
Whether certain logically relevant evidence should be held admissible
is often a question of balancing the probative value of the evidence against
the risk of undue prejudice.' In a bench trial, as distinguished from a jury
trial, there is generally much less danger that the evidence will be improperly used,2 and therefore evidence is frequently properly admissible at a
bench trial which should be held inadmissible in a jury trial.
State v. Launey3 supports this approach. Discussing whether certain
disputed evidence was admissible, Justice Summers, speaking for a majority of the court, stated: "In a bench trial the judge is especially qualified to
confine consideration of such evidence to the limited purpose for which it
4
may properly be admitted."
Characterof Victim-PriorActs and Threats
Under what circumstances may the defendant in a criminal case show
that the victim had a dangerous character and previously had threatened or
*

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University

Member, St. Mary Parish Bar.
For valuable research assistance, the writers are indebted to Aub A. Ward,
Rollin W. Cole and J.D. Collinsworth, all senior law students.
I.See FED. R. EvID. 403; UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 45 (1953); State v. Moore, 278
So. 2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor
the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443,446 (1974), reprinted in G. PUGH,
LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW 11 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as PUGH]; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 434 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. But
see LA. R.S. 15:442 (1950) (which taken literally would indicate a contrary position).
2. For authorities discussing the problem see J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J.
**

CHADBOURNE AND J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1114-127 (6th

ed. 1973); MCCORMICK § 60 at 137; 1 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE §§ 102(01) at 102-5,
201(07) at 201-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]; Davis, An Approach to
Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.A.J. 723 (1964); Davis, Hearsay in
Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV, 1362 (1970); Levin & Cohen, The Exclusionary
Rules in Nonjury CriminalCases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905 (1971); Maguire & Epstein,
Rules of Evidence in PreliminaryControversiesas to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101
(1927); Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 407 (1965); Note, 29 IND. L.J. 446 (1954); Note, 24
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 480 (1952).
3. 335 So. 2d 435 (1976).
4. Id. at 437.
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committed criminal acts against defendant or others? Essentially the problem is one of undue prejudice-protecting the prosecution against jurors
improperly permitting a defendant to go free because the person he
victimized may have been an unsavory individual.
State v.Lee5 is an exceptionally important case in the area. 6 A sharply
divided court in Lee, both on original hearing and on rehearing, takes a
broad view as to the admissibility of such evidence. Its full implications for
the future, however, are not altogether clear.
LA. R.S. 15:482 provides:
In the absence of evidence of hostile demonstration or of overt act
on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous
character or of his threats against accused is not admissible.
Prior to 1952' the provision in question required "proof" rather than mere
"evidence" of hostile demonstration or of overt act. 8 Despite the legislative
change, a number of cases continued to apply the earlier, stricter test. 9 The
majority in State v. Lee holds that if there is "appreciable evidence"' 0 of
hostile demonstration or overt act, under 15:482 the evidentiary door is
opened and the fact that the trial judge finds the unlocking evidence to be
incredible is of no moment.
The controversial Lee case goes further, however, opening the door
quite wide to the admissibility of evidence re the character and prior
conduct of a victim. Justice Tate, speaking for a divided court on original
hearing, explains that when self-defense is pleaded, evidence as to the
character and prior conduct of the defendant may be relevant on either of
two issues: (1) state of mind of the defendant as to his reasonable apprehension, or (2) ascertaining whether the defendant or the victim was the
aggressor. Where the only pertinent issue is who was the aggressor, prior
5. 331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).

6. For a discussion of earlier Louisiana jurisprudence see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651,

653 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 TermEvidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 529 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 7 (Supp. 1976); The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L.
REV. 220, 226 (1953), reprinted in PUGH at 28; Note, 10 TUL. L. REV. 642 (1936).

7. LA. R.S. 15:482 (Supp. 1952).

8. As to what constitutes an overt act see State v.Burkhalter, 319 So. 2d 392
(La. 1975), and State v. Houston, 316 So. 2d 724 (La. 1975).
9. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the

1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA L. REV. 651, 653 (1976); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525,
529 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 7 (Supp. 1976).

10. 331 So. 2d at 459.
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knowledge by the defendant as to the evidence in question may be
irrelevant. On the other hand, where the evidence is directed toward
showing the state of mind of the defendant as to what he reasonably
apprehended, his prior knowledge as to the information involved may be
all-important.
As these writers see it, State v. Lee does not fully answer the question
as to when and under what circumstances a defendant may introduce
evidence of prior threats and/or acts by the victim against the defendant or
others. Despite the fact that the questions put by defense counsel in the Lee
case were broad, general and wide-ranging, the majority found that error
was committed in the trial court's sustaining the prosecution's objections.
The court does not, however, set definite limits to the area of appropriate
inquiry, as forcefully pointed out in Chief Justice Sanders' dissent. The
majority held that where the issue is state of mind of the defendant as to what
he reasonably apprehended and the predicate set out by LA. R.S. 15:482 has
been laid, violent acts by the victim, even against third parties, shown to
have been known to the defendant, are admissible to show the defendant's
state of mind. The majority of the court takes the position that, although
recognizing that such specific acts might not be admissible to show
character, under appropriate circumstances they are admissible, apart from
the character question, to show state of mind of the defendant. In this respect
the court relies upon State v. McMillan which had concerned prior
incidents between the victim and the defendant. The whole area is to be
explored in greater depth in a casenote in a later issue of this Review.
GruesomePhotographs--Stipulationto A void Admission
Should a defendant, by a clear stipulation as to the verity of facts
sought to be proved by a gruesome photograph, be permitted to prevent the
prosecution's admission of such evidence? For example, should defendant,
by conceding the identity of the victim, or the nature and extent of the
wounds, etc. be able to prevent the admission of gory photographs of the
victim? This approach was tried by defense counsel in State v. Gilmore. 2
Reversing on other grounds, a majority of the court, speaking through
Justice Dennis, took great pains to analyze the problem exhaustively,
concluding that whether defendant should be permitted to avoid the admission of photographs in this manner is a matter addressing itself to the
II.

223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana

Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220, 226 (1953),
reprinted in PUGH at 28.

12.

332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976).
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discretion of the trial court. In a splendid discussion he carefully outlined the
factors that should weigh with the trial court in the exercise of its discretion.
The supreme court seems to look with favor upon the propriety of the trial
court's accepting such an unequivocal stipulation, as a substitute for the
contested photographs. Presumably the trial court's discretion would be
subject to appellate review by the supreme court in light of the factors
outlined.
Gruesome Photographs-TheRisky BalancingTest
The admissibility of allegedly gruesome photographs confronted and
divided the court in State v. Smith." The test to be applied as to the
admissibility of such photographs appears to be generally accepted and
settled, i.e., for the photograph to be admissible it must be relevant and its
probative value must outweigh its probable inflammatory effect.' 4 The
difficulty comes in the application of the test. On original hearing in State v.
Smith, a majority of the court held that the test was unsatisfied and that the
admission of the photograph in question was reversible error. On rehearing,
a divided court reversed itself, holding that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in letting in the contested photograph, a color photograph of the
upper portion of the victim's body in the morgue. The justices differed as to
whether or not the photograph was in fact gruesome or grisly and as to its
probative value and relevancy. Although the prosecution prevailed on
rehearing, there is an indication that a majority of the court is perhaps more
concerned than previously about the admissibility of allegedly gruesome
photographs.' 5 In the opinion on rehearing, affirming the trial court's
admission of the evidence, Justice Calogero indicated that a "prosecutor
would do well to avoid flirtation with reversible error. ''16
REFERENCE TO A DEFENDANT'S OTHER CRIMINAL CONDUCT

Improper ProsecutorialQuestion RegardingPriorCriminalConduct
In State v. Meshell17 the majority of the court held that under certain
13.

327 So. 2d 355 (La. 1976).

14. See State v. Gilmore, 332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976); State v. Chase, 329 So. 2d
434 (La. 1976); State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301 (La. 1975); and State v. Beach, 320 So. 2d

142 (La. 1975). See also the discussion in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts
for the 1970-1971 Term-Evidence, 32 LA. L. REV. 344,351 (1972), reprinted in PUGH

at 72.
15. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220 (1953), reprinted in PUGH at 73; and
Note, 14 LA. L. REV. 421 (1954), reprinted in PUGH at 66.
16. 327 So. 2d at 362.
17.

332 So. 2d 767 (La. 1976). See also State v. Green, 315 So. 2d 763 (La. 1975).
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circumstances the prosecutor's asking of a suggestive question re other
criminal conduct constitutes a comment by the prosecutor as to such conduct
and thus necessitates a reversal. '8 In a strongly worded opinion which relied
in part on State v. Frazier19 and the ABA Standards 20 the court held that a
"mistrial is mandatorily required by statute because of the prosecutor's
comments by way of question to inadmissible evidence of offenses other
than that for which the defendant is on trial.''21 In rejecting the state's
contention that under the circumstances presented no reversible error was
committed, the court held that under the pertinent statute such improper
prosecutorial conduct automatically entitles the defendant to a mistrial and
a trial court's failure to grant same is reversible error. The writers agree. The
innuendos wafted23 by the questions were highly prejudicial and it is
believed that the questions were properly classified as prosecutorial comment. Earlier judicial pronouncements indicating a contrary view, it is
respectfully submitted, should now be regarded as non-authoritative. 24
Improper Prosecutorial Question Regarding Juvenile Offense
Is an improper prosecutorial question relative to a defendant's prior
inadmissible juvenile offense to be deemed a prosecutorial comment on a
defendant's inadmissible other "crime" in contravention of Code of
Criminal Procedure article 770, thus necessitating a mistrial? It is submitted
that generally it should, that reference to an act committed by a juvenile
which would have been criminal if committed by an adult is usually just as
prejudicial in the eyes of the jury as a reference to a similar act committed by
an adult. The provision in LA. R.S. 13:1580, that a person adjudged a
juvenile delinquent shall not be considered a "criminal," is to protect the
juvenile from the ill effects of such a determination.
Nevertheless, State v. Roberts2 5 holds that an improper prosecutorial
18. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.
19. 165 La. 758, 116 So. 176 (1928).
20.

(1971).
21.
22.

ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION Standard 5.6(b)

332 So. 2d at 769.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770.

23. For a splendid analysis of a related problem in a different context by Justice
Jackson, see Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
24. See the discussion in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 656 (1976), and the cases and
discussions therein cited. Also to be contrasted with the court's holding in State v.
Meshell is its disposition of an analogous problem in the earlier case of State v. Ross,
320 So. 2d 177 (La. 1975), discussed in the text at notes 27-30, infra.
25. 331 So. 2d 11 (La. 1976).
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question relative to defendant-witness's juvenile delinquency record is not a
reference to a prior crime within the meaning of Code of Criminal Procedure
article 770 and hence does not necessarily require a mistrial and that a
judicial admonition to disregard may suffice to protect defendant's rights.
This interpretation seems to these writers strained, and the holding, it is
submitted, should be limited to the context in which it arose. In Roberts,
had the juvenile act involved been committed by the defendant as an adult,
the conviction for such act would have been admissible against him for the
26
purpose of impeaching his credibility as a witness.
Prosecutorial Responsibilityfor a Police Witness's Answer Regarding
Defendant's Prior A rrests
In State v. Ross 27 the prosecuting attorney had asked the police witness
called by him to read the defendant's statement "in full." In compliance,
the witness commenced reading, in question and answer form, the statement
made by the defendant. One of the questions earlier put to the defendant by
the officer and thus read by him to the jury was, "How many times have you
been arrested?" 28 The trial court sustained the defendant's objection and
admonished the jury to disregard same, but denied defendant's motion for a
mistrial. The majority of the court, over forceful dissents by Justices
Calogero and Barham, held that this was not a reference by the district
attorney to other crimes and hence Code of Criminal Procedure article 770
was not violated. Noting that the prosecuting attorney himself possessed a
copy of the statement, Justice Calogero in dissent maintained that when the
prosecuting attorney asked the police officer called by him to read such
statement what was read was in fact a comment by the district attorney
within the meaning of article 770. Justice Barham in his dissenting opinion
argues forcefully that any surplusage in a defendant's statement read by a
state's witness on request of the prosecutor should be treated as a comment
by the prosecuting attorney.
It is submitted that if the prosecution is not to be held responsible for
what police officers, in response to its own questions, read into evidence,
the door is open to much abuse. 2 9 Further, it is believed that the Ross case
does not harmonize well with the realistic attitude reflected in the later case
of State v. Meshell. 3°
26. See also the discussion of State v. Meshell, 332 So. 2d 767 (La. 1976),
discussed in the text at notes 17-24, supra.
27. 320 So. 2d 177 (La. 1975).

28. Id. at 179.
29. See also in this connection The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 657 (1976).
30. 332 So. 2d 767 (La. 1976). See text at notes 17-24, supra.
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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Chemical Tests on Suspected Drunken Drivers
A number of cases decided during the past term concerned the
admissibility of the results of chemical tests to prove intoxication in
prosecutions for driving while intoxicated. Taken as a whole, they underline
the necessity of strict adherence to statutory standards.
LA. R.S. 32:663 sets forth two criteria for such chemical analyses: (1)
that they be performed by methods prescribed by the state department of
health, and (2) that they be performed by a person issued a permit to do so by
that department.
The foundation case of State v. June13 I held that the statute's certification requirement is mandatory, not directory. 32 State v. Jones3 3 held that in
light of the best evidence rule of LA. R.S. 15:436 and the non-permanent
character of the certification, defendant is entitled to force the prosecution to
produce the certificate itself. Merely adducing testimony by the person
administering the test that he possessed a certificate is an inadequate
showing. 34 Further emphasizing the sanctity of the certification requirements, the court in State v. Bruins35 held that the fact that the results of such
a test were included in hospital records does not dispense with the necessity
of establishing certification compliance.
Addressing itself to the other requirement of LA. R.S. 32:663, the
court in State v. Jones3 6 held that
the State may not avail itself of the presumptions available under La.
R.S. 32:662 until the 'state department of health', that is the Louisiana
Health and Human Resources Administration, establishes and promulgates carefully detailed methods, procedures and techniques covering,
but not limited to repair, maintenance, inspection, cleaning, chemical
accuracy, certification, proof of adherence to which would reasonably
assure that the right articulated in Junell, supra, would be recognized
37
and implemented in the courts of law of this State.
31. 308 So. 2d 780 (La. 1975).
32. For a discussion of State v. Junell see The Work of the LouisianaAppellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 655 (1976).
33. 316 So. 2d 100 (La. 1975).
34. See also State v. Batiste, 327 So. 2d 420 (La. 1976); City of Monroe v.
Robinson, 316 So. 2d 119 (La. 1975); and State v. McGuffey, 316 So. 2d 107 (La.
1975).

35. 315 So. 2d 293 (La. 1975). See also the discussion in the text at notes 187-88,
infra.
36. 316 So. 2d at 100.
37. Id. at 105.
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Initial efforts at compliance by the Louisiana Health and Human Resources
Administration were held inadequate.38 Since then detailed implementing
regulations have been published.39
EXAMINATION AND CROSS- EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

Pre-TrialPreparation-Rightto Continuanceto Preparefor Trial
In State v. Winston 4° a divided court, speaking through Justice
Calogero, held that defendant was entitled to a new trial because of the trial
court's denial of a motion for continuance. Ten days before trial, defense
counsel had been appointed to represent defendant in a heroin distribution
case, but because of defendant's efforts to employ counsel of his choice,
appointed counsel had only three days notice, including Saturday and
Sunday, to prepare for trial relative to a crime allegedly committed some
eight months previously. Under the circumstances the writers agree that the
trial judge had abused his discretion in denying defendant's motion for a
continuance.
Pre-TrialPreparation-Rightto Interview Witnesses in Advance of Trial
From judicial pronouncements incidental to the court's granting writs
in State v. Lovett41 and State v. Baudean4 2 it appears that the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, will accord a defendant the right,
under trial court supervision, to some pretrial interviews. Both opinions are
laconic in character, but the action taken appears very important. In the
43
opinion of these writers the cases reflect a very salutary development.
Callinga Witness UnderCross-Examinationin CriminalCases
Following earlier cases,' State v. Rogers4 5 and State v. Clark46 hold
that there is no authority in Louisiana for a defendant in a criminal case to
call a witness under cross-examination.4 7 It is submitted, however, that
38. See State v. Ginn, 328 So. 2d 672 (La. 1976); State v. Karol, 316 So. 2d 106
(La. 1975); and State v. Jones, 316 So. 2d 100 (La. 1975).

39. See 2 LOUISIANA REGISTER no. 11 at 390 (Nov. 20, 1976).
40. 327 So. 2d 380 (La. 1976).
41. 329 So. 2d 753 (La. 1976).
42. 332 So. 2d 460 (La. 1976).
43. See also Gregory v. United States, 369 F. 2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
44. State v. Brent, 248 La. 1072, 184 So. 2d 14 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 992
(1966); and State v. Bush, 297 So. 2d 415 (La. 1974).
45. 324 So. 2d 403 (La. 1975).
46. 325 So. 2d 802 (La. 1976).
47. As to the obligation, however, of the state to call a pertinent police witness
on a motion to suppress, see State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678 (La. 1975).
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some witnesses are so presumptively pro-prosecution or anti-defendant that
perhaps a defendant should be permitted to do so. Louisiana law stipulates
that if a party can show that a witness called by him is "hostile" or
"unwilling" then leading questions are to be permitted. 48 What showing
shouldbe required to meet this test? May the required antipathy or reticence
be established by inference or relationship? It can be argued that in a
realistic sense most police officers called by a defendant as defense
witnesses will be "hostile" or "unwilling" within the spirit of LA. R.S.
15:277, and in appropriate circumstances defendant should be permitted to
ask them leading questions just as the state is often permitted to put leading
49
questions to a sibling or other person closely identified with the defendant.
5
0
For example, in State v. Willis the supreme court held that a showing by
the prosecution that a state witness (the victim of an alleged aggravated
battery committed by the defendant) had had an illicit relationship with the
defendant was sufficient, without more, to establish "hostility" for this
51
purpose.

The Federal Rules go far towards permitting leading questions by a
party calling a witness identified with the opposition. Without making a
distinction between civil and criminal cases, the Federal Rules provide that
leading questions may be put to "a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a
witness identified with an adverse party. '"52 Further, under the Federal

Rules there is no prohibition against a party's impeaching a witness called
by him. 53 In Louisiana civil cases the legislation permits a party to both
48. LA. R.S. 15:277 (Supp. 1967) (formerly R.S. 15:373).
49. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 544 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 16
(Supp. 1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 TermEvidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 449 (1974), reprinted in PUGH at 27 (Supp. 1976).
50. 241 La. 796, 131 So. 2d 792 (1961), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term-Evidence, 22 LA. L. REV. 397 (1962),
reprinted in PUGH at 135.
51. Perhaps a higher standard should be required to show "hostility" sufficient
to authorize a party to impeach a witness called by it. For a discussion of the standard
to be applied in the impeachment context see Justice Tate's concurring opinion in
State v. Rossi, 273 So. 2d 265 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA.L. REV. 443, 454 (1974),
reprinted in PUGH at 38 (Supp. 1976).
52. FED. R. EVID. 611(c) (Emphasis added). For a case permitting leading
questions to be put by the defense to a government agent see United States v. Bryant,
461 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir. 1972), which cited the then proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
611 (c). See also 3 WEINSTEIN § 611(05) at 611-59.
53. FED. R. EvID. 607.
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cross-examine and impeach an opposing party called by him and his
'representatives.'" "
ATTACKING CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

"Surprise" as Basisfor ImpeachingOwn Witness
Under Louisiana law a witness's prior inconsistent statement offered
for the purpose of impeachment is to be given neutralizing effect only; the
out-of-court statement is not to be given substantive weight. 55 In keeping
with this approach LA. R.S. 15:488 provides that for a person calling a
witness to establish "surprise" within the meaning of the article, and in
consequence thereof to be able to impeach him by showing a prior
inconsistent statement, the party calling him must show not only that the
witness failed to testify as expected, but that he testified on "some material
matter against the party introducing him and in favor of the other side."
Thus if a person, in advance of trial, gives a written statement to the
prosecutor stating that he was present at the scene of the alleged murder and
saw the defendant stab the decedent, but when called to the stand testifies
that he was not at the scene of the crime, the prior out-of-court statement is
inadmissible. The prosecution's chances of success, it may be assumed, are
unquestionably greatly decreased by the failure of the witness to testify as
expected, but since the witness on the stand has testified to nothing hurtful
to the state's case, the out-of-court statement is inadmissible, because in
theory neutralization is unnecessary. The out-of-court statement is hearsay,
is inadmissible to establish the truth of its contents, and since it is not needed
to neutralize, under 15:488 it is inadmissible. This approach by Louisiana is
56
in keeping with traditional evidentiary theory.
57
The rule, it seems to these writers, was violated in State v. Governor.
Two persons in advance of trial had apparently given very helpful statements to the prosecution placing the defendants in a car going towards the
scene of the robbery. At the trial they testified instead that they saw a car
54. LA. CODE CIv. P. art 1634. "Representative" is defined in article 1634 as "an
officer, agent or employee having supervision or knowledge of the matter in

controversy, in whole or in part, whether or not he is in the employ of or connected
with the party at the time his testimony is taken."
55. See the discussion in State v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 467 (La. 1976), discussed
in text at note 209, infra; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 661, 665 (1976); and The Work of the
LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306,
311 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 104.
56. MCCORMICK §§ 34 at 67, 251 at 601.

57. 331 So. 2d 443 (La. 1976).
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similar to that of one of the defendants but that they were unable to give
further detailed information concerning it or its occupants. It seems to these
writers that the witnesses had not given testimony favorable to the defendant
within the meaning of 15:488. They had merely failed to give testimony
expected by the state to be favorable to the prosecution. A majority of the
court held, however, that the requirements of 15:488 were met and that the
out-of-court statement was admissible.
Capacityto Perceive
May a witness who has testified that he saw or heard a particular thing
be cross-examined as to his capacity to perceive such thing? Absent the
witness's admission of the claimed incapacity, may extrinsic evidence (for
example, a physician's testimony) be introduced to show that the witness
lacked the physical or mental capacity to perceive that which he purports to
have seen, etc.? Similarly, may a party by cross-examination or extrinsic
evidence bring out that a witness was so under the influence of alcohol or
drugs at the time he allegedly perceived that his capacity to observe was
thereby impaired? Although Title 15 does not enumerate lack of capacity or
impaired capacity as a method available in Louisiana to attack a witness's
credibility, it is a method well-recognized elsewhere in the country 58 and
presumably should be available in Louisiana. State v. Luckett 59 accepts the
availability of such a method of attacking credibility in Louisiana, and the
writers completely agree.
The propriety of the application of the rule under the particular facts of
Luckett, however, appears open to serious question. The defendant on
cross-examination was questioned as to whether at the time of the alleged
robbery he had marijuana in the back of his car or had been smoking same
that night. The defendant answered in the negative but by implication
indicated that he had smoked same on prior occasions. There was no
showing that the state had evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana
on the night involved or had been smoking it at that time. Nor does it appear
that the state contended that the defendant-witness's ability to perceive the
events testified to had been impaired by the use of such substance. In fact,
this justification for the admission of the testimony does not appear to have
been urged upon the court on original hearing. The majority of the court on
original hearing ruled that the question was an improper reference to another
58. See MCCORMICK §45 at 94; 3WEINSTEIN §607(04) at 607-33; 3A J. WIGMORE,
§§ 933, 934, 989-95 at 761, 762, 921-35 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as 3A WIGMORE.
59. 327 So. 2d 365 (La. 1976).
EVIDENCE
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crime and the writers agree. It is submitted that for the state to be permitted
to ask such inflammatory questions of a witness, especially of the defendant
himself, it should be required to demonstrate bona fide basis for belief as to
the witness's use of such drugs on the occasion in question and that same
impaired his ability to perceive.' Otherwise the lack of capacity method for
attacking credibility may prove to be an unwholesome vehicle for the
prosecution's suggesting to the jury otherwise inadmissible and highly
prejudicial matter.
Bias, Interest, Corruption
A number of cases decided during the past year concerned attempts to
attack the credibility of a witness by showing bias, interest or corruption, a
well recognized method of attacking a witness's testimony. 61 As shown by
Davis v.Alaska ,62 defendant's right to examine a state's witness as to such
matter in a criminal case is of constitutional dimension, partaking of his
right of confrontation.
It seems to these writers that much of the difficulty encountered in this
area concerns the problems of remoteness, probative value, and risk of
undue prejudice-how weighty and significant must be the matter inquired
about for the examiner to have a right to develop it by cross-examination and
extrinsic evidence? It is true that some Louisiana cases have said that to
show bias the matter must be "personal" or "direct,' 63 but it is believed
that the real problem here, as is so often the case elsewhere in the law of
evidence, is a balancing one, juxtaposing the probative value of the
anticipated evidence against the time, expense and risk involved in developing it.' Generally a defendant in a criminal case has such a significant
60. For analogous safeguards in other areas, see Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469 (1948); State v.Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973); State v.Billstron, 276
Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967); State v.Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167
(1965); and Miller v.State, 418 P.2d 220 (Okla. 1966).
61. See LA. R.S. 15:492 (1950).
62. 415 U.S. 308 (1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV.525, 538 (1975), reprinted
in PUGH at 33 (Supp. 1976).
63. See the cases collected in State v.Lewis, 328 So. 2d 75 (La. 1976); State v.
Senegal, 316 So. 2d 124 (La. 1975); and see the discussion in The Work of the
LouisianaSupreme Courtfor the 1955-1956 Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REV. 421,426
(1957), reprinted in PUGH at 110.
64. See the discussion intext at notes 13-16, supra. See State v.Moore, 278 So.
2d 781 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA.L. REV. 443,446, reprinted inPUGH at 14 (Supp.
1976). See also FED. R. EVID. 403 and UNIFORM R. EvID. 45 (1953).
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interest in showing the bias, interest, or corruption of a state's witness that
he should be given wide latitude. On the other hand, because of the risk of
unduly prejudicing the rights of the defendant, at times it may be proper to
restrict the state somewhat in its efforts to attack the credibility of a
defendant's witness.
It seems to these writers that to show bias, interest or corruption, it will
often be necessary to go into a collateral matter, and that this circumstance
should not preclude cross-questioning for the purpose of showing same, nor
the introduction of extrinsic evidence to establish it. 65 Often bias, interest or
corruption that might cause a witness to lie or color his testimony arises from
"collateral" or side issues. For example, the state's star witness may have a
grudge against the defendant because the defendant had an affair with the
witness's wife-a matter wholly collateral to the merits of the criminal case.
It is believed that the provision in LA. R.S. 15:494 relative to the impropriety of impeaching as to "collateral facts or irrelevant matter" is to be read as
limiting impeachment under the preceding section re a showing of prior
inconsistent statement 66-not as a limitation on showing bias, interest or
corruption via collateral matter. There is language in State v. Lewis67 and
State v. Johnson,68 however, which would indicate a contrary result. The
real question, it is submitted, is the strength of motive to falsify, not whether
the motive arises from some collateral matter.
The writers would urge that normally all matter relevant to show bias,
interest or corruption is admissible-both on cross-examination and by
extrinsic evidence. The broad sweep of this method of attacking credibility
is well recognized by the majority of the court, speaking through Justice
Tate in State v. Senegal:69 "The decisions of our own jurisprudence...
have generally permitted full scope of cross-examination in the interests of
exposing, for jury evaluation, any bias or interest of the witness, which
might influence his perceptions or color his testimony.' '70 As recognized by
See MCCORMICK § 40 at 81.
66. LA. R.S. 14:493 (1950).
67. 328 So. 2d 75 (La. 1976).
68. 322 So. 2d 119 (La. 1975). It is difficult to tell what the supreme court would
have held in the Johnson case had the intended purpose been made clear as to defense
65.

counsel's question of a white victim of an alleged interracial rape, ".

.

. you don't

have any prejudice against black people do you?" The trial judge had said he did not
see the relevancy of the question, and defense counsel apparently did not clarify the
intended relevance at the trial court level. Defendant urged on appeal that" [if he had
been permitted to establish this fact (prejudice against Negroes),. . . the inference
would be clear that the victim's bias and prejudice would never permit her to admit
that she had consented to sexual intercourse with a Negro." Id. at 121.
69. 316 So. 2d 124 (La. 1975).
70. Id. at 126. See also the language of the court in State v. Lewis, 328 So. 2d 75
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the courts, however, there are limits to such inquiry. Unfortunately, neither
the language used in etching out the limits, nor the location of the line, has
always been satisfying. Intriguing cases decided during the past year are
illustrative.
The court, we believe, was clearly correct when, speaking through
Justice Marcus in State v. Guidry,71 it held that defendant's conviction had
to be reversed because of the trial court's denial of defendant's efforts to
show that a state's star witness, a paid undercover informant, had, five
months subsequent to the alleged offense, attempted to kill the defendant via
a shotgun blast. The fact that it was subsequent to the offense, or perhaps
would open a collateral issue, did not cause it to be inadmissible-the
incident definitely tended to show ill will towards the defendant.
On the other hand, it is submitted that the court erred in State v.
Romano 72 in refusing to permit defendant to show that a state's witness, a
confidential informant, had pending criminal charges against him. As
indicated by Justice Tate in dissent, this seems contrary to the thrust of
Davis v. Alaska , 3 for the answer may well have indicated that the
prosecution had "leverage" on the state's witness and hence the witness
may have had a strong motive to attempt to please the prosecution. 74 It is
believed that LA. R. S. 15:495, which generally prohibits attacking credibility by showing prior arrests, is not controlling here, for properly construed,
it addresses itself to a generalized showing that a witness is not worthy of
belief because he has a "record" and does not preclude showing a prior
75
arrest where, as here, it has independent particularized relevancy.
(La. 1976), where, however, the court found that the matter inquired into by the state
was too remote. See the discussion of Lewis in the text at notes 78-80, infra.
71. 319 So. 2d 415 (La. 1975).
72. 320 So. 2d 167 (1975).
73. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
74. It seems also contrary to the court's 1959 decision in State v. Lewis, 236 La.
473, 108 So. 2d 93 (1959), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REV. 335. 340 (1960), reprinted in PUGH at

133.
75. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 538 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 33
(Supp. 1976); and The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956
Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REV. 421, 426 (1957), reprinted in PUGH at 110; and in
Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of PriorArrestsin Louisiana CriminalTrials, 19
LA L. REV. 684 (1959), reprinted in PUGH at 53. Where the inquiry is as to prior
criminal conduct having no particularized relevance to show bias, interest or corruption of the witness, but merely claimed relevance to the witness's general credibility,
see the discussion of the second Prieurcase, 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973) in State v.
Romano, 320 So. 2d 167 (La. 1975), discussed in the text at note 72, supra;and in The
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The breadth of the attack permitted when it is the defendant who
launches the attack, is reflected in State v. Senegal .76 The trial court upheld
the prosecution's efforts to block inquiry concerning why an undercover
state police narcotics officer had entered upon such a career three and a half
years before, when the stated purpose of the inquiry "was to ascertain
whether the witness was motivated by grudge or prejudice." 77 A majority of
the court, speaking through Justice Tate, found reversible error.
To be contrasted with the holding in Senegal is State v. Lewis.78 The
majority of the court in Lewis held that it was error, albeit non-reversible
error, for the trial court to permit the prosecution to question a defense
witness as to 'whether the witness's brother had been arrested for an
unrelated offense. The court found that such possible basis for bias was "too
remote and involving too collateral an issue for it to be available as
impeachment." 79 The result in Lewis, it is believed, is sound. The bias
against the prosecution that might have been provoked by such an arrest of
the witness's brother, however, may have been quite real. Had it been the
defendant who was trying to show an equivalent bias or prejudice on the part
of the state's witness against the defendant, under Davis v. Alaska defendant should perhaps have been permitted to inquire into it. In light of
societal interest in favor of protecting the rights of the accused, the scales are
often weighted in defendant's favor and this is perhaps but another area in
which such differentiation operates. Whether the claimed bias is "personal" or "direct," it is submitted, should not be the determinative test. 80 As
above indicated, the essential inquiry is balancing the probative value of
evidence against the risk of harm.
Reputation Testimony
State v. Muse 8 is an important case concerning the proper method to
impeach a witness by reputation testimony. A majority of the court,
speaking through Justice Summers, found reversible error in the trial court's
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts forthe 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L.
REV. 443, 453 (1974), reprinted in PUGH at 36 (Supp. 1976); Comment, Other Crimes

Evidence in Louisiana-To Attack The Credibility of the Defendant on CrossExamination, 33 LA. L. REV. 630 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 111.
76. 316 So. 2d 124 (La. 1975).

77. Id.at 125.
78.
79.

328 So. 2d 75 (La. 1976).
Id. at 80. However, two members of the court, Justices Dixon and Dennis,

felt that the cross-examination was proper.
80. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1955-1956Term-Evidence, 17 LA. L. REV. 421,426(1957), reprinted in PUGH at 110.
81. 319 So. 2d 920 (La. 1975).
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sustaining of the state's objection to defendant's question relative to
whether a state's witness knew another state's witness's "general reputation
in the community." The court found that sustaining the state's objection in
this regard was an improper curtailment of defendant's right of crossexamination and violated his right of confrontation. Both the majority
opinion, and the dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Sanders, give important discussions of the proper method of impeaching a witness by reputation
testimony.
As pointed out by Chief Justice Sanders in dissent, the question put to
the witness in Muse was not as articulate or precise as it might have been.
Under LA. R.S. 15:490 two types of reputation testimony are admissible to
impeach a witness: (1) his reputation as to general moral character, and/or
(2) his reputation for truth. This reputation, says Muse, is the reputation of
the witness to be impeached "in the place where he resides. "82 The majority
opinion also takes pains to spell out that in Louisiana, as is often the case
elsewhere,83 a person attacking a witness's credibility via reputation testimony, after eliciting the required reputation testimony on the issue of
credibility, may go further and ask the impeaching witness whether, from
his knowledge of the reputation, he would believe him under oath.
Arguably Louisiana law in this area should be realistically reevaluated
in light of modern conditions. 84 In the meantime it is very helpful to have the
prevailing rules clarified.
Prior Convictions-Useof UncounseledConvictions
In State v. Bernard5 a unanimous court, speaking through Justice
Summers, reversed a conviction because of the failure of the trial court to
permit defense counsel to attempt to show that convictions sought to be used
by the prosecution to impeach the defendant had been obtained in denial of
his federal constitutional rights. The decision is in accord with the United
86
States Supreme Court opinion in Loper v. Beto.
82.

Id. at 922.

83. See United States v. Walker, 313 F. 2d 236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.

807 (1963); and the discussion in 3A WIGMORE § 923 at 728.
84. See MCCORMICK § 44 at 90.
85. 326 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976).
86. 405 U.S. 473 (1972). See in this connection the discussion of State v. Kelly,
271 So. 2d 870 (La. 1973), in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443, 452 (1974), reprinted in PUGH at 35
(Supp. 1976).
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PriorConvictions-JuvenileDelinquencyAdjudication
In keeping with LA. R.S. 13:1580, the court in State v. Roberts8 7 takes
the position that a witness may not properly be impeached by inquiries
relative to adjudications of juvenile delinquency or guilty pleas to charges of
88
same. This aspect of the opinion appears eminently sound.
Cross-Examinationas to PriorCriminalActs, Absent Conviction
May a witness, for the purpose of impeachment, be cross-examined as
to an unrelated prior criminal act when the witness was never convicted of
said crime? The second Prieurcase89 held that he could not. 90 In both State
v. Romano 91 and in the opinion on original hearing in State v. Luckett9 2 the
court indicates continued adherence to this doctrine. 93 The facts of Romano
are especially strong in this connection because they involved an alleged
criminal act bearing directly upon general veracity-whether an important
state's witness had falsified his federal income tax return. In this connection
Chief Justice Sanders stated that "evidence of Dodd's malfeasance in
preparing his income tax returns was not competent evidence for impeaching his credibility .inthis prosecution. 94
87.

331 So. 2d II (La. 1976).

88. As to prosecutorial reference to an act of juvenile delinquency which, if
committed by an adult, would have been a crime, see the discussion of State v.
Roberts in the text at notes 25 & 26, supra.
89. 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443,453 (1974), reprinted
in PUGH at 36 (Supp. 1976). See also the extensive discussion in the excellent student
comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Attack the Credibility of the
Defendant on Cross-Examination, 33 LA. L. REV. 630 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at
I11.
90. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) permits inquiry in such matters within the
discretion of the court "ifprobative of truthfulness or untruthfulness," but precludes
extrinsic evidence as to same.
91. 320 So. 2d 167 (La. 1975).
92. 327 So. 2d 365 (La. 1976). On rehearing the court reversed itself finding that
the prosecutorial inquiry was proper to show lack of capacity. For adiscussion of this
aspect of the case, see the text at note 58-60, supra.
93. See also in this connection State v. James, 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974), and
State v. Mason, 305 So. 2d 523 (La. 1974).
94. 320 So. 2d at 169. If the prior criminal act is found to have a particularized
relevance to show bias, interest or corruption of the witness, then it is submitted that
the broader rules governing impeachment by a showing of bias, interest or corruption
discussed above (see the text at notes 61-80, supra) should control. See also Justice
Tate's dissenting opinion in State v. Romano, 320 So. 2d 167, 170 (La. 1975).
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Experiments to Test Credibility
In State v. Mays 95 the court, speaking through Justice Tate, took what
these writers believe to be a very enlightened position relative to in-court
experiments. It held that the trial court committed error, albeit nonreversible error, in denying defendant's request to have the prosecution
witness, an undercover agent, demonstrate (if he could) how, as his
testimony claimed, he had feigned puffing on a marijuana cigarette.
Although the court declared that whether or not in-court experiments should
be permitted is largely a matter within the discretion of the trial court, it
found that here the refusal to permit the experiment was an abuse of
discretion. It outlined some of the factors pertinent to such determination,
i.e., (1) "the possible disruption of orderly and expeditious proceedings"
and (2) "lack of similarity between the courtroom conditions and the actual
conditions sought to be re-tested."I
In the later case of State v. Hampton97 the court, applying the above
standards, found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying
defendant the right to insist that a witness (prosecutrix in a rape case) "yell
to the top of [her] voice" 98 as she claimed to have done at the scene.
In light of State v. Mays, the authority of prior cases affirming trial
courts' refusal to permit in-court experiments to test a witness's identifica99
tion of the defendant as the culprit seems dubious.
Right to Productionat Trial of a Witness's PriorMemorandum
Under what circumstances may a cross-examiner have access to a
witness's prior memorandum for use in cross-examination and impeachment? The problem is of great significance and has been frequently before
the Louisiana Supreme Court in recent years. 100 In an exceptionally able and
10
perceptive concurring opinion in State v. Babin on original hearing, '
95.

315 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975).

96. Id. at 768.
97. 326 So. 2d 364 (La. 1976).
98. Id. at 366.
99. See State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So. 2d 444 (1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 959 (1972), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 312 (1973). See also the concurring
opinion by Justice Tate and dissenting opinions by Justices Dixon and Calogero in
State v. Hinkie, 321 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975) (regarding defendant's right to force a
non-suggestive in-court identification procedure).
100. See the discussions in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525,534 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 243,
244 (Supp. 1976).
101. 319 So. 2d 367, 372 (La. 1975). The case was ultimately decided on a different

issue.
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Justice Tate 1°2 indicates great dissatisfaction with Louisiana's current
position as to defendant's right to inspect a state witness's prior memorandum for purposes of cross-examination and possible impeachment. These
writers agree with the concurring opinion statement that present rights in
Louisiana in this regard are far too restrictive. 103 The procedures suggested
by Justice Tate seem well thought out and practical, and it is hoped that in an
appropriate case they will be adopted by the court.
The concurring opinion in Babin is also very valuable in its careful
analysis in differentiation of analogous related problems-pretrial discovery, required prosecutorial disclosure, etc.l°4
PRIVILEGE

Attorney-ClientPrivilege
In civil cases Louisiana's attorney-client privilege °5 is similar to that
in most states." ° Generally, it applies only to confidences between the
client and the attorney, and under usual circumstances there is no attorneyclient privilege as to the identity of the client represented by the attorney. 107
In contrast to those in other states and to Louisiana's privilege in civil cases,
Louisiana's statutory attorney-client privilege for criminal cases expressly
applies to "any communication made to him as such legal adviser by or on
behalf of his client, or any advice given by him to his client, or any
information that he may have gotten by reason of his being such legal
adviser. "' 08 Does this mean that in Louisiana criminal cases even the name
and identity of the client is subject to privilege? Without discussing the
broader ambit of the privilege provided in the Louisiana criminal statute,
and relying on the weight of authority elsewhere, a majority of the supreme
102. Justice Barham joined in the concurring opinion. From language in State v.
Foret, 315 So. 2d 278 (La. 1975), it appears that Justice Calogero also agrees with the
opinions expressed by Justice Tate in his concurrin.g opinion in Babin.
103. See the discussion of State v. Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So. 2d 305 (1957), in
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Evidence, 18 LA.

L. REV. 139, 143 (1957), reprinted in PUGH at 689; and in Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 350
(1958), reprinted in PUGH at 686.
104. See also the concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, 323 So. 2d 132 (La.
1975); and State v. Foret, 315 So. 2d 278 (La. 1975).
105. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2283.
106. See MCCORMICK § 89 at 182.
107. See Shaughnessey v. Fogg, 15 La. Ann. 330 (1860); Comment, Purposeand
Extent of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Louisiana, 18 LA. L. REV. 162 (1957),
reprinted in PUGH at 155; MCCORMICK § 90 at 185.
108. LA. R.S. 15:475 (1950).
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court in State v. Hayes1" held that an attorney may be forced, in a
proceeding to declare the defendant a recidivist,"1 ' to identify the defendant
as the person he had defended in a prior criminal proceeding. The court said:
the privilege protected any communication made to the attorney during
his representation or information obtained as a result of it, . . . [it] did
not under the present facts extend to the fact that he had represented
him, a matter of public record. 1 '
Husband-Wife Privilege-ConfidentialConversations
R.S. 15:461 provides that private conversations between husband
and wife shall be privileged. State v. Dupuy" 2 is a helpful case reestablishing the private nature of the husband-wife conversation. It follows
State v. Pizzolotto11 3 in saying that where there is no evidence to the
contrary, communications between spouses are presumed to be confidential. However, when a party seeking to introduce a husband-wife conversation makes a prima facie showing that the conversation was not in private,
Dupuy makes clear that the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts
to the party claiming the privilege to show that the conversation was in fact
private. 114
LA.

Husband-Wife Privilege-Concubines
State v. Kaufman" 5 makes it clear that, as long suspected, there is no
confidential concubinage communication privilege. The fact that had the
witness and defendant lived in another state, the witness might have
qualified as a common-law wife, did not give rise to a husband-wife
privilege-either general or confidential-under Louisiana law.
Physician-PatientPrivilege-Ambit of Privilege
When a person entering jail is given an in-custody physical examination by a state physician for the limited purpose of making objective
109.

324 So. 2d 421 (La. 1976).

110.

LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (Supp. 1958).

111. 324 So. 2d at 423. For further discussion of the problem see State v. Jones,
284 So. 2d 570 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts

for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525,541 (1975), reprinted in PUGH
at 44 (Supp. 1976).
112. 319 So. 2d 194 (La. 1975).
113. 209 La. 644, 25 So. 2d 292 (1946).
114. In Dupuy the defendant who claimed the privilege failed to introduce

evidence to show that the conversation was in fact private.
115. 331 So. 2d 16 (La. 1976).
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16
findings, the results of such examination, says the court in State v. Berry, 1
are not subject to the doctor-patient privilege set out in LA. R.S. 15:476. In
so holding, the court emphasized that the witness had not been consulted by
the defendant as a physician. The doctor had made a routine physical
examination conducted as an agent for the state independent of the wishes of
the defendant.

Physician-PatientPrivilege- Waiver
Although not a part of the traditional common law, 1 7 a physicianpatient privilege has been recognized by approximately three-fourths of the
states,"' including Louisiana. 119 This privilege has been strenuously
attacked by scholars, 12 ' and except as to psychotherapists,I 2 was rejected by
the Supreme Court in its promulgated but unadopted version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Like other privileges, it stands athwart judicial ascertainment of truth. In State v. Berry' 22 an important case in the privilege
area, Justice Tate held that by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity and
tendering this issue at trial, defendant has waived his physician-patient
privilege as to pertinent physician-patient data. Defendant, said the court,
should not be permitted to ask the court to find him not guilty by reason of
insanity and at the same time prevent effective judicial inquiry into the facts
of such alleged insanity. The language of the statute creating the privilege,
however, is very broad, stating that without "express consent," no doctor
shall
disclose any communication made to him as such physician by or on
behalf of his patient, or the result of any investigation made into the
patient's physical or mental condition, or any opinion based upon such
investigation, or any information that he may have gotten by reason of
123
his being such physician ....
A question that naturally occurs is whether the consent found by Berry
116. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
117. MCCORMICK § 98 at 212.
118. Id.
119. LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950) (criminal) and LA. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1968) (civil).
120. McCORMICK § 105 at 223-28; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a at 828-32
(McNaughton ed. 1961).

121. See Rule 504 in the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240 (1972). Congress, however,
when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted a truncated approach to
privileges and avoided the problem.
122. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
123. LA. R.S. 15:476 (1950).
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from the insanity plea extends to testimony by a private psychiatrist
consulted by a defendant for treatment. In light of Berry, defense counsel
contemplating an insanity defense should proceed with much caution, and
the client should be well advised as to the possible implications of such a
plea.
Clergyman-PenitentPrivilege
State v. Berry is one of the rare cases in the country discussing the
clergyman-penitent privilege. In light of the facts therein presented, the
court found that the privilege did not lie, for although made to a minister by
the defendant, "the communication was not made within the requisite
nature of a confidential disclosure for religious purposes of a penitent to a
1 24
clergyman seeking religious consolation."Accountant Privilege-Availabilityin Criminaland/orCivilProceedings
LA. R.S. 37:85 would appear to authorize a broad accountant testimonial privilege. It states:
No . . .public accountant . . .shall be required to, or voluntarily

disclose or divulge, the contents of any communication made to him by
any person employing him to examine, audit, or report on any books,
records, or accounts, or divulge any information derived from such
books, records, or accounts in rendering professional services except
by express permission of the person employing him . ...
The next succeeding section 125 contains broad emasculating language
stating that " [n]othing in R.S. 37:83 through 37:85 shall modify, change,
or affect the criminal laws of this state

.

.

. any

rules or laws of evidence of

this state, or any proceedings held in any court." R.S. 37:83 and 37:84
discuss the procedure to be followed by the Louisiana State Board of
Accountants relative to the discipline, etc. of its members. It may have been
that 37:86 in fact was intended to apply only to Sections 83 and 84, and that
a clerical error was committed. As written, however, the language of 37:86
seems thoroughly enigmatic. If it is applied literally, there is no accountant
testimonial privilege in any court proceeding, civil or criminal. But giving
37:86 this interpretation would generally negate the significance of 37:85.
Applying 37:86 literally, the court in State v. McKinnon' 26 held that
an accountant privilege is not available in a criminal proceeding. The
124. 324 So. 2d 822, 829 (La. 1975).
125. LA. R.S. 37:86 (1950).
126. 317 So. 2d 184 (La. 1975).
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logical extension of its reasoning would negate the availability of an
accountant privilege in a civil suit as well.
A forceful argument can well be made against having an accountant
privilege. 127 In any event, if there is to be a meaningful privilege here, a new
statutory enactment seems to be called for.
Accountant Privilege-Waiver
In State v. McKinnon' 28 the court as an alternative basis for its
conclusion, held that the accountant privilege asserted by the defendant had
been waived. Although the defendant apparently owned one-third of the
stock of the corporation and presumably was a director thereof, the
accountant had been employed by the corporation; the president, two of the
three directors, 129 and the accountant himself had expressly waived the
privilege. This aspect of the case appears eminently sound and since the
accountant privilege appears to be that of the person employing the
accountant, rather than the accountant himself, waiver by the accountant
appears to have been unnecessary. Waiver by the person employing him, it
is submitted, would have sufficed.
Police Records Privilege
In his very able concurring opinion in State v. Babin3 0 Justice Tate
argues most persuasively that except as to records identifying police
informers, LA. R.S. 44:3's exemption of police records from the operation
of the public records act does not thereby make such records privileged; it
merely takes them out of the broad category of public records to which,
under the law, members of the public are entitled to immediate access. 131
It
does not, argues Justice Tate, cause them to be privileged from production
in a judicial proceeding. Under this approach, police records are like records
of a business or private person, i.e., although not available for public
inspection generally, they are in appropriate cases subject to forced production in a judicial proceeding.
In a later plurality opinion in State v. Chase,1 32 authored by Justice
127. See MCCORMICK § 77 at 156.
128. 317 So. 2d 184 (La. 1975).
129. One of whom was the above mentioned president.
130. 319 So. 2d 367, 375 (La. 1975).
131. See the discussion of a purported police records privilege in The Work of The
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term- Evidence, 26 LA. L. REV. 606,
613 (1966), reprinted in PUGH at 191. See also Flanagan v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274
(5th Cir. 1974).
132. 327 So. 2d 391 (La. 1976).
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Summers, a contrary position was taken by three members of the court.
Three justices, however, expressed a view similar to that taken by Justice,
Tate in his concurring opinion in Babin. The seventh member of the court,
Justice Dennis, found it "unnecessary to discuss La. R.S.44:3" 3' 3 because
in his opinion it was not applicable to the case.
The writers agree with the position advanced by Justice Tate in his
concurring opinion in Babin. The contrary view throws in jeopardy the right
of the defendant to have a copy of his own written confession, a view wisely
adopted by the supreme court in 1945 in a forward-looking decision in State
V. Dorsey, 13 4 and followed ever since.
Justice Tate's approach is buttressed by the court's action in State v.
Berry.1 5 On a very analogous problem re the hospital records exemption
from the public records act, a unanimous court in Berry, speaking through
Justice Tate, stated in footnote that "the purpose of the Public Records Act
is to provide for immediate public inspection of public records, . . . not to
create a privilege exempting them from production for court purposes. Cf.
'
State v. Babin, La., 319 So. 2d 367, 375 (1975). 136
Comment Upon orInference FromClaim of Privilege
Is a party entitled to force a non-party witness to assert a privilege in
open court, to comment thereon, and to have the trier of fact draw an
inference therefrom? In line with the direction recently indicated by State v.
Haynes' 37 a unanimous court in State v. Berry,'138 heavily relying on the
ABA Standards, held that a defendant in a criminal case had no right to call a
witness and force that witness to assert his privilege against selfincrimination in open court. 139 The court used broad language which by its
133. Id. at 394.
134. 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945). See the discussion in The Work of the
LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1964-1965 Term- Evidence, 26 LA. L. REV. 606,
613 (1966), reprinted in PUGH at 191.
135. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).

136. Id. at 827.
137. 291 So. 2d 771 (La. 1974), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 542 (1975), reprinted
in PUGH at 47 (Supp. 1976).
138. 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
139. Compare, however, the opinion of the court in State v. McMullan, 223 La.
629, 66 So. 2d 574 (1953), discussed in Note, 14 LA. L. REV. 427 (1954), reprinted in
PUGH at 173; with State v. Jacobs, 281 So. 2d 713 (La. 1973), discussed in The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA L. REV.
525, 542 (1975), reprinted in PUGH at 47 (Supp. 1976). As to the propriety of the
drawing of an inference in a civil case from a party litigant's claim of his privilege
against self-incrimination, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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terms would apply to all privileges, not simply to forcing a third person to
assert his privilege against self incrimination:
It is improper conduct for either the prosecution or the defense
knowingly to call a witness who will claim a privilege, for the purpose
of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege. American
Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice, Relating to the Prosecution Function, Standard 5.7(c), and Relating to the Defense
Function, Standard 7 -6(c) (1971).
As the commentaries to these standards indicate, claims of
privilege are preferably determined outside the presence of the jury,
since undue weight may be given by a jury to the claim of privilege and
due to the impossibility of cross-examination as to its assertion. (The
commentaries also note the impropriety of either counsel arguing any
inference from the failure of another to call a witness, if the failure to
do so is known to be based on the witness's claim of privilege.) For
similar reasons, the courts have uniformly rejected a defendant's claim
of error based upon the denial of his request that a witness assert his
claim of privilege before the jury, See UnitedStates v. Lacouture, 495
F. 2d 1237 (CAS, 1974), and decisions therein cited. See also Namet v.
United States,
373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L. Ed. 2d 278
4
(1963).' 0

The view espoused is similar to that contained in the version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence promulgated by the United States Supreme Court. 141 The
Berry decision appears to be contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court's
1952 unanimous decision in State v. Gambino.142 The Gambino case,
however, was not discussed by the court in Berry.
State v. Duhon,'4 decided subsequent to Berry, reemphasizes the
Louisiana Supreme Court's continued adherence to the principles announced in Berry. A majority of the court held that despite the absence of a
pertinent, specific contemporaneous objection by defense counsel, " if the
prosecution knows that a severed co-defendant will assert the privilege
140. 324 So. 2d at 830.
141. See Rule 513 in the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court, 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972). Congress, however,
when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a truncated approach to the
whole field of privileges and took no position on this problem.
142. 221 La. 1039, 61 So. 2d 732 (1952), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220, 223 (1953),
reprinted in PUGH at 342.
143. 332 So. 2d 245 (La. 1976).
144. See the discussion in text at notes 219-30, infra.
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against self-incrimination and nonetheless calls the severed co-defendant to
the stand, defendant is entitled to a new trial. In a forthright, praiseworthy
per curiam, Judge Earl E. Veron, the trial judge, had reflected great
sensitivity to the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
prosecutorial action, and indicated that upon subsequent reflection he felt
that because of it he should have declared a mistrial.
HEARSAY

Admissibility of HearsayEvidence at PreliminaryExamination
From judicial pronouncements incident to writ denials,' 45 it appears
that the Louisiana Supreme Court is now taking the position that hearsay
evidence is admissible in the preliminary examination provided for by
Louisiana statutory 146 and constitutional 147 provisions. With deference and
for reasons elaborated upon by others earlier in the pages of this Review,' 48
the writers urge that a contrary view should be taken.
It is submitted that the preliminary hearing mandated by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 4 9 should be sharply
differentiated from that required by Louisiana law. The federal constitutionally required hearing, as these writers understand it, is in the nature of the
first appearance hearing held in other states and formerly required under
Louisiana law. 15 0 The hearing mandated by the federal constitution is to be
held immediately after a person is arrested without a warrant, whether for a
felony or misdemeanor, before extended incarceration. At such a hearing
the defendant is entitled only to minimal safeguards. In contrast, the
Louisiana statutes make clear that the proceeding therein contemplated is an
adversary proceeding at which defendant has the right to be present, to be
represented by counsel, to call witnesses, and to cross-examine those called
by the state.' 5 ' Further, in contradistinction to the federally mandated
hearing, Louisiana statutes make no provision for a preliminary examina145. State v. Font, 324 So. 2d 821 (La. 1975); and State v. Perkins, 316 So. 2d 385
(La. 1975).
146. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 293-95.
147.

LA. CONST. art. I, § 14.

148. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 TermLouisiana ConstitutionalLaw, 36 LA. L. REV. 533,544 (1976); and Note, 36 LA. L.
REV. 1050 (1976).

149. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
150. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts 79-82 (1928), repealed by La. Acts 1966, No. 310. See
Note, 36 LA. L. REV. 1050, 1055 (1976).
151. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 293-95 and accompanying comments.
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tion in misdemeanor cases. Thus, it is submitted that a defendant arrested
without a warrant for a felony in Louisiana, before extended incarceration,
should have the right to two hearings-(1) the summary Gerstein v. Pugh
hearing immediately after arrest (wherein admittedly his procedural
safeguards are minimal), and (2) the later more extensive Louisiana
preliminary examination spelled out by Louisiana statute and since 1974,
52
protected by state constitutional provisions.'
It is quite appropriate to utilize hearsay at a first appearance-Gerstein v.
Pugh hearing. On the other hand, in light of the Louisiana statutory
provision's redactors' comments, 153 and the pertinent Louisiana constitutional language and history, 1 54 it is submitted that absent a hearsay exception, hearsay evidence should be held inadmissible at Louisiana's more
elaborate preliminary examination.
Admissions-Statements by Co-conspirators
Under certain circumstances, as an aspect of the admissibility of
admissions, statements and actions of a defendant's co-conspirator in
furtherance of the common effort are admissible against a defendant. The
traditional theory is that such a co-conspirator's statement is impliedly
authorized by his confederate and is therefore admissible as an admission by
an implied agent. The potential for abuse, however, is enormous and the
problems encountered myriad-much too broad to be adequately covered in
a survey such as this.' 55 It is anticipated that the matter will be explored in a
student comment published later in this Review. Louisiana's statutory
provision 56 is similar to that in many other states. To protect the defendant,
it stipulates that for a co-conspirator's statement to be admissible against the
defendant "a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been established."
152. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor the 1974-1975 TermLouisiana ConstitutionalLaw, 36 LA. L. REV. 533, 544 (1976).
153. See especially comment to LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 294.
154. DOCUMENTS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 715-18, 1153 (1976).
155. For a discussion of the problem see UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63 (1953);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508 (1942); MCCORMICK § 267 at 639; 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1079-80a at 180-201 (Chadbourn ed. 1972); Comment, Co-Conspirators,

2 So. U.L. REV. 128 (1975).
156. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950) provides: "Each coconspirator is deemed to assent to
or to commend whatever is said or done in furtherance of the common enterprise, and
it is therefore of no moment that such act was done or such declaration was made out
of the presence of the conspirator sought to be bound thereby, or whether the
conspirator doing such act or making such declaration be or be not on trial with his
co-defendant. But to have this effect, a prima facie case of conspiracy must have
been established."
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Three cases 5 7 of great importance in the area divided the court during
the past year, and it is difficult indeed to predict what the court will do in the
future with the issues therein presented. Much will depend on the views of
Justice James L. Dennis, the newly elected member of the court.
DeclarationsAgainstInterest
Traditionally, to qualify under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule, 58 a statement must have been made by a person now
unavailable, with respect to a matter as to which he had firsthand knowledge, and so much against his pecuniary and proprietary interest that a
reasonable person under the circumstances would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true. 5 9 Thus, the exception is a narrow
one and a majority of jurisdictions do not include within it declarations
against "mere" penal interest. This position, however, has been much
criticized"6 and the subject of a lacerating attack by Justice Holmes in his
famous dissent in Donnelly v. United States. " In keeping with the
provisions of earlier reform codes, 62 the recently adopted Federal Rules of
Evidence expand the declaration against interest exception, inter alia, to
include those against penal interest.16 3
In his dissenting opinion in State v. Morrow," Justice Summers
157. State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16 (La. 1976); State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848
(La. 1975); and State v. Brown, 326 So. 2d 839 (La. 1975).
158. The declaration against interest exception is sharply to be distinguished from
admissions, statements made by a party litigant or one in privity with him, etc.,
offered by his opponent. The strictures applied to admissibility of declarations
against interest are generally totally inapplicable to admissions. For a discussion of
the two exceptions and the reasons underlying the distinction between them, see
MCCORMICK § 276 at 670.
159. See Davis v. Lloyd, 1 C. & K. 276 (1844); MCCORMICK §§ 278-80 at 673-79; 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1455 at 323, 1469 at 346 (Chadbourn ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as 5 WIGMORE].
160. See MCCORMICK § 278 at 673; 5 WIGMORE §§ 1476-77 at 349-62.
161. 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913).
162. See UNIFORM RULE OF EvID. 63(10) (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
509 (1942).
163. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) sets forth the declaration against interest
exception as -[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
164. 255 So. 2d 78 (1971), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 318 (1973), reprinted
in PUGH at 445.
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urged expansion of the declaration against interest exception to include
declarations against penal interest, but the majority of the court in that case
65
found it unnecessary to reach the issue.1
The very significant case of State v. Gilmore 66 deals directly with the
problem. Relying upon Dean Wigmore's treatise, the views expressed by
Justice Summers in dissent in Morrow, and Justice Holmes' dissent in
Donnelly, Justice Dennis, speaking for a majority of the court, held that
under the circumstances presented, an unavailable declarant's confession
to a homicide should be deemed admissible under an exception to the
hearsay rule. The exact ambit of the Gilmore holding is not clear. The
circumstances presented were particularly appealing from the standpoint of
admissibility-the out-of-court declaration appeared very trustworthy and
unsuspicious, there were circumstances to corroborate the truthfulness of
the absent declarant's confession, and the third party's confession was
offered by the defendant. In light of Chambers v. Mississippi,167defendant
may have had a constitutional right to have the out-of-court declaration held
admissible. It may, therefore, be premature to assert that Louisiana has
without reservations accepted the declaration against penal interest as an
exception to the hearsay rule. It is not clear, for example, whether the court
will hold such a statement admissible when offered by the state, and there
68
are constitutional confrontation problems inherent in such an extension.
The contours of the exception, the protective safeguards that may be
established, and the extent to which (as in the Federal Rules of Evidence) the
court may further liberalize the declaration against interest exception all
remain as yet undetermined.
PriorReported Testimony-Unavailability
Is testimony given by a state's witness at a prior trial admissible if the
165. The majority concluded that under the circumstances there presented the
"unavailability requirement" had not been met.
166. 332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976).
167. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See discussion in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate
Courtsfor the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 LA L. REV. 525, 544 (1975), reprinted in
PUGH at 26 (Supp. 1976). See also discussion in Federal Rulss of Evidence, Hearsay
Evidence and the Federal Rules: Article VIII-II. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule:
Expanding the Limits of Admissibility, 36 LA. L. REV. 159, 181 (1975).
168. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974); Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rules 804(b)(3), 56 F.R.D. 183, 327 (1972), and Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence, Hearsay Evidence and the Federal Rules: Article
VIII-JI. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: Expanding the Limits of Admissibility, 36
LA. L. REV. 159, 181 (1975).
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witness is produced by the state but persists in refusal to testify, and at the
request of the state is held in contempt of court and sentenced for same?
Appropriately, in State v. Ghoram'69 the court held that under these
circumstances the prior testimony was admissible, that the witness could
properly be deemed "unavailable." It is significant that in accordance with
a requirement indicated by Professor McCormick's treatise 170 in a passage
quoted and relied upon by the court, all available judicial pressures had been
brought to bear upon the witness to force him to testify.
In a strongly worded plurality opinion' in State v. Jones,'72 Justice
Tate reemphasized the requirements of the federal confrontation clause
enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Barber v. Page'73 and
' and succeeding
followed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Sam 74
7
cases." ' Justice Tate stressed that testimony given by a witness at a prior
hearing is inadmissible on behalf of the state "unless the state proves the
witness is truly not available for the trial despite good-faith and diligent
efforts to locate him timely before the trial and to produce him at the
trial." 71 6 The plurality opinion took the position that such a showing had not
been made relative to prior testimony given by the deputy coroner, but
found that under the extremely narrow circumstances there presented the
admission of the prior testimony on an uncontroverted matter was nonreversible error. The importance of the prosecution's good-faith attempt to
produce live witnesses can hardly be over-emphasized.
Res Gestae
When is an out-of-court statement admissible as part of the res gestae?
The problem is a difficult one and continues to perplex the courts. The
Louisiana statutory -statement'77 seemingly affords a narrow scope to
169.
170.
171.

328 So. 2d 91 (La. 1976).
MCCORMICK § 253 at 608, 612.
Justice Dixon dissented without written reasons from affirmance of the

conviction. In light of his opinions in State v. Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974), and
State v. Soukup, 275 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973), it is perhaps not unreasonable to presume
that he agreed with the plurality opinion in its finding that the trial court committed
error in receiving the prior testimony but would have held the trial court action
reversible error.
172. 325 So. 2d 235 (La. 1975).
173. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
174. 283 So. 2d 81 (La. 1973).
175. State v. Moore, 305 So. 2d 532 (La. 1974); State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300
(La. 1974).

176. 325 So. 2d at 238.
177.

LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950).
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statements admissible as part of the res gestae, but at times it has been given
broad interpretation. 178 Part of the confusion, it is believed, results from
blending statements admissible as part of the res gestae with those admissible as excited utterances. 179 These two avenues of admissibility, it is
submitted, should be sharply distinguished and separately analyzed. 180
Although continuing somewhat to merge res gestae and excited
utterances, a majority of the court in State v. Williams181 adopts a more
literal, narrow interpretation of Louisiana's res gestae statutory provisions.
In the opinion of the writers, there is great danger in letting too much
evidence in under the amorphous res gestae shibboleth, and a return to the
narrow scope of the Louisiana statutory definition is desirable.
Ancient Documents
Osborn v. Johnston 82 is one of the rare cases interpreting Louisiana's
broadly phrased statutes regarding the admissibility and authenticity of
recorded "ancient documents." 1 83 Emphasizing that Louisiana's statutory
provisions, contrary to those in other states, were designed as part of a
system for land recordation, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the court
of appeal's holding that the showing of a material alteration of an ancient
recorded document necessarily dissipates the presumption of execution and
genuineness provided by the statute. The court held instead that
[tihe combination of age and recordation not only authenticates
the old document, making it admissible in evidence, but also, by the
terms of the act, establishes 'a prima facie presumption of the execu84
tion and of the genuineness of such instrument'. 1
Although, of course, the presumption thus created is rebuttable, the court
found that the circumstances presented in the instant case were insufficient
to rebut the presumption.
178. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605,257 So. 2d 121 (1971); State v. Reese,
250 La. 151, 194 So. 2d 729 (1967).
179. See also in this connection the recent cases of State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d
897 (La. 1975), and State v. Sneed, 328 So. 2d 126 (La. 1976).

180. See The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor the 1971-1972 TermEvidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306, 316 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 514; Comment,
Excited Utterancesand Present Sense ImpressionsAs Exceptions to the HearsayRule
in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969), reprinted in PUGH at 494.
181. 331 So. 2d 467 (La. 1976).
182. 322 So. 2d 112 (La. 1975). Although one of the co-authors of this discussion,
James McCleiland, is an associate with one of the law firms that handled this case, he
did not participate in the preparation or presentation of the case.
183. LA. R. S. 13:3728-31 (1950).
184. 322 So. 2d at 116.
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HospitalRecords
State v. June1185 and succeeding cases recognized that the legislature
had established strict mandatory standards for the admissibility of the results
of PEI (Photo-Electric Intoximeter) tests to show drunkenness in prosecutions for driving while intoxicated. In light of the provisions of LA. R.S.
13:3714 regarding the admissibility of hospital records,' 86 does the inclusion of the results of a PEI test in a hospital record provide a means for
avoiding the rigorous requirements of the Junell line of cases? With much
force and reason, State v. Bruins'87 answers in the negative. The court in
Bruins held that notwithstanding the provisions of the Hospital Records
Act, the results of PEI tests are to be given no evidentiary value unless the
state affirmatively shows "that the blood sample was taken and analyzed by
persons who have the requisite qualifications and certification set forth in
188
LA. R.S. 32:663 and LA. R.S. 32:664.'
Admissibility of PoliceReports
As recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in two cases 89 decided
during the past term, the mere fact that an out-of-court statement is
contained in a police report does not mean that it necessarily escapes the
hearsay rule. To do so, it must qualify under some recognized exception., 9o
Statements in Complaintsto Police
May a police officer witness, over a hearsay objection, testify to
complaints and statements made to him? Here, as so often is true elsewhere
in the law of evidence, the major problem usually encountered is one of
relevancy.
If the question arises on a motion to suppress, as opposed to the trial,
the testimony will often be admissible despite the hearsay objection because
185. 308 So. 2d 780 (La. 1975), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 655 (1976). See the
discussion in the text at notes 31-39, supra.

186. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV. 381,388 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 409.
187. 315 So. 2d 293 (La. 1975). See also discussion in text at note 35, supra.
188. Id. at 295.
189. State v. Bizette, 334 So. 2d 392 (La. 1976); and State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d 301
(La. 1975).
190. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-

Evidence, 28 LA. L. REV. 429, 433 (1968), reprinted in PUGH at 492; The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REV. 335, 347

(1960), reprinted in PUGH at 493.
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the relevancy is to show probable cause-whether the police officer at the
time he acted in arresting the defendant (or made a search without a warrant)
had probable cause to do so and hence whether evidence obtained as the
result of such arrest (or search) was constitutionally obtained. At such a
motion to suppress hearing, therefore, the major question is often the state
of mind of the officer as to what he had reason to believe, not the truth of the
out-of-court complaint or statement. Such use of the statement in the motion
to supress hearing is a non-hearsay use. 9'
At the criminal trial itself, however, rarely is the state of mind of the
officer at issue. The validity vel non of the arrest or the reasonableness of the
police officer's conduct is normally of no moment to the trier of fact in
determining whether the evidence adduced as to the guilt of the defendant
adds up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, at the trial, as distinguished from the motion to suppress hearing, it is usually improper to permit
the police officer, over a hearsay objection, to testify as to the contents of
complaints and statements made to him by a third person, for the relevance
of such statements is normally the truth thereof rather than the fact that they
were made. Such use in the trial context, therefore, is generally a hearsay
use, and usually there is no hearsay exception within which the out-of-court
complaint or statement can fit.' 92 Under certain circumstances the admission of such statements would violate the defendant's right of
93

confrontation. 1

Justice Tate, speaking for a majority of the court in State v. Thompson, 194 provided an exceptionally lucid analysis of the problem. All
members of the court agreed that testimony by a police officer as to what an
unnamed informer had told him prior to his arrest of the defendant was
191. See the discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 673 (1976); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV. 443,
455 (1974), reprinted in PUGH at 201 (Supp. 1976).
192. In some cases, however, the out-of-court statement will fit into an exception
to the hearsay rule, as, for example, unsuspicious complaints made by a rape victim
shortly after the alleged rape, or the newly created extension of such exception for
unsuspicious statements made by the alleged victim of child abuse shortly after such
alleged abuse. See the Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651,674 (1976). See also the discussion in the text at
notes 177-81, supra; and the discussion in the text at notes 202-04, infra.
193. See Favre v. Henderson, 464 F. 2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942
(1972). See State v. Favre, 255 La. 690, 232 So. 2d 479 (1970), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 LA. L. REV.
381, 385 (1971), reprinted in PUGH at 429. See also Favre v. Henderson, 444 F.2d 127
(5th Cir. 1971); Favre v. Henderson, 318 F.Supp. 1384 (E.D. La. 1970).
194. 331 So. 2d 848 (La. 1976).
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hearsay. 19 The majority opinion states that although the fact of the
complaint and what the officer did as a result thereof is non-hearsay, the
content of the statement is inadmissible hearsay. Although it is true that the
fact of the complaint and the action taken as a result thereof is not hearsay,
they are often irrelevant to the facts in issue, and to the extent such testimony
implies the contents of an out-of-court utterance, its admission, it is
submitted, may well run afoul of both the hearsay and confrontation
rules. 196
It must be conceded, however, that several recent cases have permitted
the contents of out-of-court statements received, heard, or communicated
by police to come into evidence over a hearsay objection. For example, in
State v. Calloway197 the witness was permitted to testify that he received a
"report on the radio that the two suspects were believed to be in a black
Cadillac,"' 98 for the court found that the testimony was admissible "to
explain the sequence of events leading to the arrest of the defendants from
the viewpoint of the arresting officers."
The opinion does not state why,
at the trial on the merits, the officers' viewpoint was relevant to the guilt or
innocence of defendant. Similarly, in State v. Singleton2" the court held
that a police officer could testify, over a hearsay objection, to a description
he broadcast over the radio-a description he had received from a man
across the street as to a vehicle that man said he saw drive away from the
scene of the crime-because the testimony by the officer as to what he
himself did was a fact within his knowledge.2"' With deference it is
submitted that what the officer testified to was a description of the car given
by another person where the relevance of the statement appears to have been
that such a car drove away from the scene of the crime, the truth of which
statement was as to a critical fact not within the knowledge of the testifying
witness. In both Calloway and Singleton the truth of the statement, rather
than the fact of the statement, appears to have been the relevant circumstance. In the opinion of the writers such cases as Calloway and Singleton
195.

Three of the justices felt, however, that under the circumstances admission

of the testimony was harmless error.
196. See the discussion of State v. McLeod, 271 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973), in The Work
of the LouisianaAppellate Courts forthe 1972-1973 Term-Evidence, 34 LA. L. REV.
443, 445 (1974), reprinted in PUGH at 201 (Supp. 1976).

197. 324 So. 2d
198. Id. at 809.
199. Id.
200. 321 So. 2d
201. The court
circumstances was

801 (La. 1975).
509 (La. 1975).
held alternatively that the testimony, if hearsay, under the
harmless error.
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are inconsistent with the approach taken in the later Thompson decision.
Thompson, it is believed, represents the correct view.
Complaint by Child Abuse Victim
In State v. Comeaux20 2 a majority of the court, speaking through Chief
Justice Sanders, held admissible, over a hearsay objection, statements by a
five-year-old, bleeding, hysterical child, given about thirty minutes after
the attack, as to the cause of her physical condition. The court held same
admissible either as part of the res gestae or under an extension of the
exception regarding the admissibility of the first complaint of an allegedly
sexually assaulted young child. Although it seems questionable to these
writers whether such a statement could properly fit under the res gestae
exception, 203 the writers agree with expanding the complaint of the sexually
assaulted victim to include such unsuspicious, trustworthy statements of the
physically abused young child as here presented. There is obvious danger,
however, in giving too wide a berth to such an exception, and constitutional
problems are presented." It should, it is submitted, be narrowly restricted.
PriorStatement by Witness
Does the fact that a person testifies as a witness cause out-of-court
statements by him to be admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule
or as non-hearsay? Phrased differently, does the fact that an out-of-court
declarant is now on the stand, under oath and subject to cross-examination,
cause the out-of-court declaration made by him to be admissible as
non-hearsay or under some hearsay exception? The traditional view is that
such out-of-court statements are hearsay and do not necessarily fit under an
exception to the hearsay rule.2 ° Although the position has been
criticized, 2° 6 it is generally adhered to in the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 7
202. 319 So. 2d 897 (La. 1975).
203. See also discussion in the text at notes 177-81, supra.
204. See discussion in the text at notes 191-201, supra.
205. See State v. Ray, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REV. 306,
311 (1973), reprinted in PUGH at 104; and The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts
for the 1974-1975 Term- Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 665 (1976).
206. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVID. 63(1) (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule
503(b) & comment (1942); MCCORMICK § 251 at 601; 3A WIGMORE § 1018 at 995.

207. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. There are, however, exceptions under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Prior inconsistent statements under certain narrow
circumstances are admissible for substantive weight (FED R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A)), as
are certain prior consistent statements (FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(b)), and by a
post-adoption Congressional amendment, prior identifications by a witness (FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(1)(C)) are also deemed non-hearsay. See also Blakely, Substantive Use
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Justice Tate in a very well-reasoned opinion in State v. Williams20 8 makes it
clear that Louisiana continues to adhere to the traditional view. Neither of
the two dissents in the Williams case voiced disagreement with this view of
the hearsay rule. It appears, therefore, to be firmly established, and in the
writers' opinion, desirably so.
Self-serving Statements
As was well recognized by Judge Culpepper speaking for the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in Lambert v. Heirs of Adam ,2° the fact that an
out-of-court statement was or was not "self-serving" does not necessarily
determine whether the statement is inadmissible hearsay or is admissible
under some exception to the hearsay rule. It is true that to qualify as a
declaration against interest21 ° the statement in question must be disserving,
but this is not a necessary qualification for all exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Often, as recognized by the court, the fact that a statement was "selfserving" properly goes to the weight to be given to the statement, not to its
admissibility.
Necessity-Trustworthiness as Basis for New Exceptions-Safety Codes
After extensive consideration of the problem, the court in Burley v.
LouisianaPower and Light Co. ,21 speaking through Justice Summers, held
that the National Electric Safety Code, outgrowth of a project sponsored by
the National Bureau of Standards and agreed to by a number of responsible
organizations, may, over a hearsay objection, be given probative weight in
determining negligence. The court recognized that the Code had not been
adopted by any law or ordinance, but stressed the trustworthy character of
the Safety Code, its wide acceptance and reliability, and the need for
considering such evidence. The court recognized that the persons preparing
the Code were not in court under oath subject to cross-examination, but
stressed that the twin elements of necessity and trustworthiness which
underlie most exceptions to the hearsay rule 21 2 were present and said that
Louisiana courts of appeal have for some time received such evidence. In so
holding, the court acknowledged that it was taking a minority view. The
of PriorInconsistentStatements Under the FederalRules of Evidence, 64 KENT. L.J.

3 (1975).
208. 331 So. 2d 467 (La. 1976).
209. 325 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 329 So. 2d 458 (La. 1976).

210. See discussion in the text at notes 158-68, supra.
211.

319 So. 2d 334 (La. 1975).

212. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REV. 321,322(1970), reprinted in PUGH at 526.
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evidence seems to these writers appropriate for consideration in a civil case,
especially a non-jury case. 213 Perhaps, however, provision should be made
for advance notice to the opponent of the intention to utilize such evidence,
as required by the Federal Rules of Evidence for omnibus hearsay
exceptions. 214
Weight to be Given Hearsay Testimony Admitted Without Objection
Where inadmissible hearsay is admitted without objection, may it be
given probative weight by the trier of fact? The traditional view is that such
evidence may be given the probative value to which it is found by reason to
be entitled.2 15 Professor McCormick's treatise tells us that this view is
almost universally accepted.2 16 In Coleman v. Victor 217 the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeal for taking the contrary
position, held that "uncontradicted hearsay testimony" may be given
probative value. 218 The traditional view, as noted above, would go even
further, and it is to be anticipated that the Louisiana Supreme Court would
do so in an appropriate case.

PRESERVING

RiGHTs FOR APPEAL

Necessityfor Contemporaneous Objection re Admissibility of Evidence
In a number of criminal cases decided during the past year the court
held that defendant had lost his right to remedy on appeal because of his
counsel's failure to comply with the provisions of Code of Criminal
Procedure article 841 et seq. regarding the necessity for contemporaneous
objection, etc. to the prosecution's attempt to get evidence before the trier of
fact. Although in 1974 Louisiana repealed its anachronistic bills of exception procedure, 219 the legislation stipulates
It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is
made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires
213. See material cited in note 2, supra.
214. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
215. MCCORMICK § 54 at 125.
216. Id. at 126.
217. 326 So. 2d 344 (La. 1976).
218. The court's decision was also based on the finding that by soliciting the
evidence himself, the complaining party had waived his objection.
219. See Joseph, The Assignment of Error: A New Procedure for Appellate
Review, I So. U. L. REV. 36 (1975); The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courtsfor
the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 677 (1976).
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the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the
grounds therefor. 220
The purpose and reason underlying the contemporaneous objection rules is
helpfully discussed in State v. Marcell.2 21 State v. Sosa222 and State v.
Powel1223 reemphasize that definitely to protect oneself a specific objection
should be made.
Thus Louisiana follows the traditional rule that an overruled general
objection to the admissibility of evidence tendered by an opponent is
ordinarily insufficient to protect one's rights on appeal; 224 the grounds for
the objection should be given. 2 25 Traditionally however, there have been
exceptions to the general rule. 226 The language used by the court in Sosa and
Powell, however, does not appear to admit of the traditional exceptions, nor
does the language in Code of Criminal Procedure article 841 expressly
recognize them. It is to be hoped, however, that to prevent injustice and
undue technicality, exceptions will be recognized in appropriate cases.
Several cases decided during the past term reflect a liberal attitude
towards the statute. In State v. Jones22 7 the court indicated that the statute is
to be given a common sense non-technical interpretation, and in State v.
Griffin228 the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Summers, displayed a
willingness to consider an imperfectly articulated objection. Further, in
220. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 841. Where federal constitutional rights are involved
however, federal standards as to waiver are generally applicable. See Comment,
Post-conviction Remedies and Waiver of ConstitutionalRights, 26 LA. L. REV. 705
(1966), reprinted in PUGH at 567.
221. 320 So. 2d 195 (La. 1975). See also State v. Spain, 329 So. 2d 178 (La. 1976).
For the discussion of the contemporaneous objection rule see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651,
677 (1976).
222. 328 So. 2d 889 (La. 1976).
223. 325 So. 2d 791 (La. 1976).
224. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 841.
225. As to the necessity of stating the grounds for the admissibility of evidence,
where the opponent is the one making the objection, see State v. Moorcraft, 319 So.
2d 386 (La. 1975). Compare this case with the recent case of State v. Charles, 326 So.
2d 335 (La. 1976).
226. See the discussion in MCCORMICK § 52 at 113; and I WEINSTEIN 103(01) at
103-5. Under the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) a specific
objection is not required if the specific ground was "apparent from the context." In
addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(d) provides that "plain error" "affecting
substantial rights" may be noted on appeal despite the absence of objection. See the
discussion of "plain error" in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the
1974-1975 Term-Evidence, 36 LA. L. REV. 651, 677 (1976).
227. 332 So. 2d 267 (La. 1976).
228. 329 So. 2d 693 (La. 1976).
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State v. Duhon, 22 9 over forceful dissent, the court was willing to notice
what it found to be prosecutorial misconduct in having defendant's severed
co-defendant assert his privilege against self-incrimination in open court
despite the absence of a pertinent, specific contemporaneous objection.230
229.
230.

332 So. 2d 245 (La. 1976).
See discussion in the text at notes 185-88, supra.

